Sunset of my Fulbright Year غروب وقتي في منحة فولبريت

You know, when people hear that I’m living in the Gulf they always say: “Well, that must be hot, but at least it’s a dry heat.” In fact, I was a believer of this conventional wisdom…until I moved to Muscat. The humidity is settling in between our mountains and the shore and that means it’s time for this nomad to pick up her few possessions and move along. Where to, you ask? Coming from one of the easternmost countries in the region, I’ll be heading to the westernmost, Morocco, for a quick trip. Then, after my peregrinations in the US, I hope to be settling temporarily near the nation’s capital. If you can’t be wandering the Middle East, you might as well be based in the city that defines the US relationship with the region. And trying to influence how Americans perceive the Middle East and what policies we follow. Idealistic? You better believe it.

As I begin to say ma’salama to the Sultanate, I find myself reflecting on the ridiculous skills I have acquired that will sadly succumb to disuse when I leave, and the others that will stick around to benefit my future research.

Lessons triumphantly learned

• How to navigate Omani traffic circles (not to be confused with normal traffic circles)
• When to go to LuLu to avoid the mob
• Interviews are better than surveys
• You seriously, seriously, cannot bring up anything against the status quo in public conversation
• I need to buy make-up so that people think I’m older (perhaps this would stop people from calling me their “bint” or daughter, or asking me if I am under 18, or feeling free to give disparaging comments after a presentation because I am such a ‘novice’)
• How to use a squat toilet effectively

I have also been compressing my everyday observations, and feel like there are a few topics that need to be studied further, by a Fulbrighter or someone doing an extended research project in Oman. Off the top of my head (and these are only the ones that would receive approval to study AKA excepting anything politically controversial)

Driving & safety issues

Tourism expansion

Traditional dress & handicrafts

Women’s capacity building (workforce and political inclusion)

New media

 

If anyone is interested in studying these issues, please shoot an email to Middle East Nomad and I can provide recommendations for in-country affiliations, yani, Omani organizations that are investigating these topics already, but need serious help.

 

لما يسمع الناس أنني أسكن في الخليج, رد الفعل دائما: "حسنا, الطقس سيكون حار, لكن, على الأقل, الحرارة جافة." وفي الحقيقة, كنت أعتقد بهذه الحكمة التقليدية...حتى انتقلتُ إلى مسقط. الآن, تستقر الرطوبة بين جبالنا والشاطئ فهذا الوقت لانتقال هذه البدوية مرة أخرى, سأجتمع ممتلكاتي القليلة وسوف أسافر. إلى أين, تسأل؟ إذا عُمان كان من شرق هذه المنطقة, سأتوجه نحو النقطة الغربية, المغرب, لرحلة قصيرة. بعدين, بعد التجوّل في امريكا, إن شاء الله سأستقر مؤقتا قريب من العاصمة. إذا كان ليس من الممكن أن أسافر حول الشرق الاوسط, فسأقيم في المدينة التي تقول ما هي العلاقة بين الولايات المتحدة والشرق. وسأحول أن أؤثر على كيف يعتبر الامريكيون الشرق الاوسط وما هي السياسات التي نتبعها. مثالية؟ طبعا!

وكما أقول "مع السلامة" إلى السلطنة, أعيد التفكير في المهارات السخيفة التي اكتسبت بها هذه السنة والتي لن أستخدمها بعد عمان, بالإضافة إلى المهارات الاخرى التي ستكون مفيدة لبحثي في المستقبل.

والدروس التي تعملتها هي

كيف أن أجتاز الدوارات العمانية (وهي ليست دوارات عادية 

متى الوقت لتجنب الغوغاء في لولو 

المقابلات أفضل من الاتسبيانات 

ليس من الممكن, أبدا, أن تناقش أي شي ضد الوضع الراهن في المتحادثات العامة 

لازم أن أشتري مستحضرات التجميل لاقناع الناس بأنني أكبر في سن (وبعدين ربما لن يستخدمو اسم "بنت" لي, أو يسألوني إذا كنت تحت سن 18, أو ينتقدو تقديمي لانني "مبتدية") 

كيف أستخدم الحمام العماني التقليدي

وكما أركّز على ملاحظاتي, أعتقد بأن توجد مواضيع مهمة للدراسة في المستقبل, من جهة شخص في برنامج فولبريت أو أي باحث في عمان. وهي (بدون المواضيع مثيرة للجدل)

قضية السياقة والسلامة

توسيع قطاع السياحة

الملابس والحرفات التقليدية

بناء القدرات النسائية (في سوق المال وبشأن الانتخابات 

وسائل الإعلام الجديدة

وإذا شخص مهتم بدراسة واحد من هذه القضايا, أرجو أن ترسل لي رسالة بالانترنت وسأوفر التوصيات عن المنظمات العمانية التي يعمل فيها الآن, والتي تحتاج إلى المساعدة.

Strategic, Not Foolish

Sometimes the attempt to maintain friendly relations with all your neighbors and global powers makes you look a little silly. Just ask Oman.

While Obama headed a conference to address nuclear issues in DC, Tehran invented her own counter-conference, titled 'Nuclear Energy for All, Nuclear Weapon for No One.' And of course, Oman was in attendance. But not only did the Sultanate's Foreign Affairs Minister travel to Iran, but he publicly stated that, "The Tehran conference transparently shows the Islamic Republic pursues the disarmament of nuclear-armed countries and at the same time stresses that Iran's nuclear program follows peaceful objectives." If all we had to do to confirm the loftiness of our ideas and the nature of our initiatives, was to hold a conference purporting that we were following a certain path, I would like to schedule a conference to be held in Washington, DC. I will call it, "Puppies for all, Cats for no one." Thank goodness we won't have any more cat people living in our nation's capitol.

The juxtaposition of a conference aiming to highlight nuclear energy for peaceful goals, and Iran's recent war games couldn't be more humorous. As helicopters, speedboats, submarines, and other pieces of the Revoluntary Guard's military equipment are called into operation on the Strait of Hormuz - planting mines and performing other drills - Oman has to maintain her equilibrium while walking a tight rope. How does one sustain peaceable relations with a regional power that also borders the Strait of Hormuz, who could threaten Oman geo-politically, and one that has strong economic ties to the Sultanate; while continuing positive relations with the West, those countries that will continue to be the dominant world powers this century (this is just a realistic reading). In my opinion, Oman had been acting strategically, but the comments made by the Foreign Affairs Minister crossed over into foolish territory.

The absence of politics = politics غياب السياسة = السياسة

Many have asked me: "Why did you choose to come to Oman? There are no politics in Oman, and you are a Political Scientist." My response: The absence of politics is an amazing political phenomenon.

Omanis are loath to discuss anything that would cause friction between those involved in the conversation. This is not an overstatement. Yes, there are a handful of nationals out there willing to stir up a bit of trouble, but the stereotype of the Omani as laid back, chill Gulf citizen is largely accurate. The proliferation of online web forums, however, indicates that while many citizens are unwilling to publicly discuss problems facing the country, they are more than happy to do so by publishing or reading blog posts. The complacence of most Omanis + a self-censored media + burgeoning online forums + friendliness to a fault in personal interactions = unusual political phenomenon.

Politics is of course not simply a study of political undercurrents and societal awareness. A study of politics takes up the State, institutions, economics, culture, civil society, foreign relations, and oh boy does the list go on. Did anyone really imagine that a State could be devoid of politics? If one human being is trying to coexist with another, we have matter for political research.

In fact, there are immense political discussions to be had in Oman. Throughout my research project on "water" I have asked myself, how does __insert following subject__ effect water decision making?

• An economy based on oil production & rents
• A Sultanate system of government
• The welfare state
• An inflated public sector
• The history of tribes
• The comparison between Oman and her neighbors
• etc etc etc

Yes, it is frustrating to be curious about political issues and know that it is rude to bring up politics with anyone I interview. Yes, I wish there was a political science department at Sultan Qaboos University, filled with professors that understand my methodology. Yet the underlying questions that fill my research are political and have revealed a great deal about how things get done in the Middle East.

Lastly, my time as a Fulbrighter is running out. I look forward to posting some final conclusions and lesson learned from my Oman experience in the coming weeks.

قد سألني الكثير من الناس: "لماذا اخترتِ المجيء إلى عمان؟ ما في سياسة في عمان وأنت خبير في السياسة." واجابتي هي: انعدام السياسة ظاهرة سياسية نفسها.

يتردد العمانون أن ينقاشو أي شيء سيخرق الاحتكاك بين الناس في المحادثة. وهذه ليست مبالغة. نعم, توجد حفنة المواطنين وهم يريدون أن يحرّضو مشكلة صغيرة, لكن النمط عن العماني كمواطن خليجي مستريح, صحيح جدا. مع ذلك, توسيع المنتديات الالكترونية يشير إلى أن بينما معظم المواطنين غير راغبون أن يجاهرو عن المشاكل التي تواجهها عمان, هم سعداء أن ينشرو المعلومات أو يقرءو عنها في المدوّنات. ورضاء معظم العمانين + الرقابة الذاتية في الإعلام + المنتدات الالكترونية المزدهرة + صداقة العمانين بدون حد في التفاعلات الشخصية = ظاهرة سياسية غريبة وفريدة.

طبعا, السياسة أكثر من دراسة التيارات السياسية والوعي الاجتماعي. البحث عن السياسة يتناول مواضيع الدولة, والمؤسسات, والاقتصاد, والثقافة, والمجتمع المدني, والعلاقات الخارجية, إلخ. وهل تخيل شخص, في الحقيقة, أن الدولة تمكن أن تكون بدون السياسة؟ إذا حاول شخص واحد التعايش مع شخص ثاني, لدينا موضوع لدراسة سياسية.

بالتأكيد, توجد مناقشات سياسية هائلة للتناول في عمان. خلال بحثي عن "المياه" لقد تساءلتُ, كيف __واحد من المواضيع التالية__ يؤثر على صناعة القرار عن المياه؟

اقتصاد قائم على النفط

نظام سياسة "السلطنة"

دولة الرفاه

القطاع العام المتضخمة

تاريخ القبائل

المقارنة بين عمان وجيرانها

إلخ إلخ إلخ

نعم, من المحبط أن أكون فضولة عن القضايا السياسية وأعرف أن سيكون وقح إذا ناقشتُ السياسة مع أي من زملائي هنا. نعم, أرغب في وجود قسم العلوم السياسية في جامعة السلطان قابوس, مليء بالاساتذة الذين يفهمون تنظيم دراستي. لكن, تحت السطح, تتكون بحثي من الاسئلة السياسية و قد ظهر الكثير عن كيف تمشي الاشياء في الشرق الاوسط.

واخيرا, نقترب من نهاية وقتي كباحثة في منحة فولبريت. أتطلع إلى صدور بعض الملاحظات النهائية من تجربتي في عمان في الاسابيع المقبلة.

Make them accept it تُجبرهم إلى القبول

A friend of a friend has an expression that is eternally useful: “Make them accept it.”

Apparently, this individual applies his phrase indiscriminately, toward animate and inanimate objects alike. “You will accept this plug!” he cries to a stubborn outlet that hesitates to accept a laptop charger. Since picking up the phrase, I have found its usefulness to be without limits.

The most recent application of this forceful phrase came, in fact, from an interviewee. After a long discussion on the status of the environment in Oman and university, bureaucratic, and political obstacles to reform, this gentleman stated that, ultimately, if someone in power tells a farmer that he can only pump a certain amount of water from his well, he will just have to accept that regulation. They will make him accept it.

Tell people to do something and they will do it. Who would have thought that we would be asking for more authoritarian decision making and implementation in one of the world’s last remaining Sultanates? The truth is, we’ve seen evidence of strong, swift decisions on socially controversial issues in the past. My interviewee pointed out two examples, and the Omani(s) out there currently (hopefully) reading this post, please correct this if it is wrong.

Mourning traditions were a serious issue in Oman until the Sultan's intervention. Individuals were taking the customary one month off work to mourn the death of a close relative. The economic toll of this tradition is obvious, but a hidden issue of concern was the personal economic burden placed on those mourning. It was their duty to spend up to 5,000 OR (over $13,000) stocking the house with refreshments and food to extend to visitors for the duration of the mourning period. Then the Sultan said: there will be three days of mourning, and you will only provide dates, coffee, and water. Of course, at first there was some resistance from the older generation, but soon everyone changed.

Similarly, bride prices were getting out of control as Muscat and the rest of Oman developed. Then, one day, HM said that bride prices must be between 2 and 3,000 riyals, 80% lower than what they were. Of course, some people skirt this by offering jewelry and other goods in place. But these issues prove that anything can change.

Stakeholder dialogues are an ideal tool for understanding the needs of local populations when devising a development project. What is interesting in Oman, however, is that both extremes in the spectrum of scenarios are missing. We witness neither the fostering of discussion and interaction amongst farmers, professors, and officials, nor authoritarian water decisions made with finality and implemented justly on all. Instead, inertia is perpetuating our current scenario, one in which all parts of the decision making equation push forward their claims as to why strict regulation of water wouldn’t work. Their perceptions of resistance are usually unfounded. Instead, if all parties would agree on the bottom line, that water use rationalization is necessary for sustainable development, then the excuses would evaporate, and that one leader (HM or otherwise) could step forward and, you guessed it, make them—Omanis and residents—accept it.

photo: Apparently 'Accept' is a heavy metal band. Thanks Google images. I think we need the rockers to "make people accept" water regulations in Oman if no one else is willing to step forward.

صديق صديقتي, لديه عبارة وهي مفيدة جدا: "تُجبرهم إلى القبول."

ويبدو أنه يستخدم هذه العبارة بدون تمييز, إلى الناس وإلى الاشياء. "سوف تقبل هذا القابس!" يصيح إلى مقبس عنيد, يتردد أن يقبل قابس الكمبيوتر المحمول. ومنذ الوقت الذي سمعتُ العبارة فيه, لقد وجدتُ أن فائدة العبارة بدون حد.

لكن, في الحقيقة, التطبيق الاخير لهذه العبارة القوية كان من جانب شخص شرك في بحثي. بعد مناقشة طويلة عن حالة البيئة في عُمان, والعوائق من الجامعة والبيروقراطية والحكومة في طريقة الإصلاح, قال هذا الرجل إن, في النهاية, إذا قرر قائد أن المزارع يستطيع أن يضخ كمية معينة من المياه من بئره فقط, من اللازم ان المزارع يقبل القانون. ستُجبره إلى القبول.

إذا قلتَ لشخص أن يفعل شيء, سوف يفعل ذلك. ومن كان يظن أن سنطلب أكثر من صناعة القرار الاستبدادي وتطبيقه في واحد من السلطنات الاخيرة في العالم؟ في الحقيقة, رأينا دليل من القرارات السريعة والقوية بشان القضايا الاجتماعية ومثيرة للجدل هنا. واشار الرجل الذي تكلمتُ معه, إلى مثلين, وأطلب من العمانيين في القارئية (في؟) أن تصحّحون هذه المعلومات إذا وجدت مشاكل.

عادات فترة الحداد كانت قضية جدّية في عُمان حتى تدخل السلطان في الموضوع. كان من العادي أن قريب الشخص المرحوم بقى في البيت لشهر واحد بعد الموت. وبالرغم من أن العبء الاقتصادي من هذا التقليد واضح, توجد مسألة مخفية وهي أن الأهل سيُنفق حتى 5,000 ريال لتوفير المشروبات والطعام إلى زوار البيت خلال فترة الحداد. لكن, قال السلطان: ستكون ثلاثة أيام للحداد, وبتقديم التمر والقهوة والمياه فقط. طبعا, في البداية, وجدت مقاومة من جانب الجيل السابق, لكن بمرور الوقت, غيرت العادة.

على نحو مماثل, ارتفعت اسعار العرائس بشكل كبير كما تطورت مسقط وعمان عموما. بعدين, يوما ما, قال الجلالة إن اسعار العرائس لازم ان تكون بين 2 و3,000 ريال, 80 في المئة أقل من الاسعار السابقة. طبعا, بعض الناس يتحايلون على القانون بتوفير المجوهرات والبضائع الاخرى بدلا من الفلوس. لكن تُثبت هذه القضايا أن أي شيء يمكن أن نغيره.

الحوارات بين الشركاء آلية مثالية لفهم احتياجات سكان منطقة عندما تريد أن تخطط مشروع. لكن, من المثير للاهتمام في عمان أننا نفتقد القطبين: لا نشاهد تعزيز النقاش والتفاعل بين المزارعين والاساتذة والمسؤولين, ولا نشاهد قرارات استبدادية ونهائية في ما متعلقة بالمياه, وتنفيذها على الجميع بالعدالة. بدلا من ذلك, يستمر الجمود والكسل السيناريو الحالي, وفيه كل اجزاء من عملية صناعة القرار تدفع تبريرها للفشل الحتمي لاي تنظيم شديد متعلق باستخدام المياه. وتصوراتها عن قوة المقاومة ضد التغيير إلى الوضع الراهن, معظم الوقت, لا اساس لها من الصحة. إذا وافقَت هذه الاحزاب على المبدأ الرئيسي, أن ترشيد استخدام المياه لازم للتنمية المستدامة, فستتبخر التبريرات, وقائد واحد (الجلالة أو شخص اخر) يمكن أنه "يُجبر العمانيين والسكان إلى القبول."

Innovation's Dramatic Death Scene

How do we quantify development and intellectual progress? Count up the number of PhDs held by citizens? No. According to an environmental expert I recently interviewed, the real question is: What do we produce? What ideas do we have and what do we do with them? (Am I starting to sound like Thomas Friedman yet?).

Example: Omanis developed an innovative technology to filter petrochemical wastewater using plants resistant to contaminants. Israel contacts Oman to profit from this solution. Oman ends up giving away technologies such as these to larger, international companies. This would be acceptable, if there were partnerships between Omanis and the international corporations so that both sides would benefit. Alas, there are few of these mutually beneficial relationships.

Of course, innovation is based on education. And quality education is sorely lacking in the Sultanate. My interviewee criticizes many aspects of the university system that he was a part of for 20 years. He asserts that people here have not changed their way of thinking. Professors are not concerned with actually fixing problems and helping the poor. What are they concerned about? He has created three labels for scientists/professors. 1) Those that aim to please the public. They don’t publish anything that would upset them. 2) Those that aim to please the government. They just want to keep working with ministries on consultancies. 3) The opposition; the minority.

In the US, a department that is hiring will strive to bring in the best possible addition to its faculty to aid in future collaborations. Here, it’s a story of employing who you know, or who will make you look better comparatively, or who is cheaper for HR. With low quality professors who care more about keeping their jobs than anything else, what can you expect from students?

An Omani friend of mine was a public high school English teacher for one year. He hated his job. Every day he would enter class, and motivate his students in Barka by telling them how important English was to their future. But these were 12th graders who had been passed in English class since grade school, and now were preparing to graduate without knowing how to hold a conversation in that language.

At SQU, the highest level university in Oman, students are equally unmotivated and under prepared. My interviewee said that his daughter, a middle school student at a private school in Muscat, could write a more cogent essay that an SQU attendee. One SQU professor I recently spoke with said that it takes an average of 6 years for students to complete their degree. Though they are only allowed to be on academic probation (below a 2.0 average) three times, many petition high level university officials, and tally nine probations without being expelled.

Students are given free tuition at SQU, free housing, free meals, a monthly stipend. These are supposed to be the best of the best, and they are treated as such. This is just one more reason not to care as much about school. You are not wasting anything by spending more time at university; whereas in the US, two extra years at a university would cost you at least $60,000. Heck, if I was able to stay in college two years longer, for free, as opposed to having to find a real job or get locked into a marriage here, why not prolong my stay at SQU?

In class, students demand things from professors. In a science course, students revolted against a professor who used questions for his exam that did not exactly mimic the examples he gave in class. You are getting the picture. Students are not pushed to perform. They are not asked to think creatively. There is no accountability. Teachers do not set good examples. Everyone gets passed in the end.

If the education system refuses to water the seeds of innovation, bureaucracy is a rabbit that goes around gnawing at any little sprout. My new environmentally minded friend spent four months in communication with a ministry because they did not like the name of the center he was trying to establish. How many people would wait that out? How many people could afford to keep paying the rent on the building that they had chosen for their new “small/medium enterprise” to wait on a ministry to approve their name? And that is just step one. As he explained, Oman is influenced by the Egyptian administration style, and this is cancerous. It is a paper bureaucracy where many, many copies are made of any approval. People value the “proof” that paper provides and do not trust electronic systems. Long strings of procedures perpetuate the bureaucratic inertia.

Innovation. Discussion. Debate. These can all be seen as destabilizing forces because they require change. But Oman is learning that economic progress will stall without such creativity.

Farmers are Businessmen.

My time in Oman is waning, and in an attempt to extend my research on water-policy-making-and-general-investigations-on-the-public-sector-while-taking-into-account-political-leadership-in-an-oil-abundant-state * inhale * I made a trip to the bucolic neighborhoods of Barka, about 45 min. outside the capital of Muscat.

Lovely things happen when performing field work in both a tiny and friendly state such as Oman. Living in the Sultanate as an American college graduate, and one attempting to orchestrate meetings in Arabic, is kind of like being a big fish in a small pond. A big, novel fish who sometimes conjugates her Arabic verbs incorrectly.

So yesterday, following a surprising streak of excellent music on 95.9, I managed to navigate my way into the gravel parking lot of the Agricultural Development Center in Barka. Ushered into this concrete square by a nice religious man, I sat down at a conference table. Soon two other gentlemen were joining us and I learned that one was a man that I had already spoken to over the phone, and he had called up the President of the first Farmer's Association in Oman to meet with me. Some Omani's have gone completely out of their way to help in my research; others persistently ignore my calls. Ma fi mushkila.

I had set up meetings with members of this development center and of the Farmer's Association to understand interfaces for government-public dialogue in Oman. Researching water policy making has taken me on an exploration of experts and the policy implications of their research; political institutions and their leaders; the political-economy of an oil state; and most recently, understanding the individuals that will be affected by any change to the status quo.

A sweet, eloquent man donning a shorter dishdasha and sporting an admirable, thick black beard with a few streaks of kinky white hairs, the President of Oman's first farmer's union described the organization's founding. With its headquarters in Suweiq, the association was officially founded in 2008, with 40 members. They knew that local farmers were a diverse community; some old, some young, and with different ideas. But they also recognized that there were general issues facing all farmers.

What struck me about the President's introduction of the union, was that he emphasized the need to better promote Omani agricultural product, while expanding foreign markets and strengthening local ones. The second initiative that he underscored was the introduction of modern technologies to increase farm efficiency. Dude, this farmer was a businessman! Not exactly the rustic life of gathering dates from the palm trees that I imagined. Though older farmers are still using flood irrigation on their plantations and would fit into the stereotype that I had subconsciously adopted, the middle and younger generation - if they decide to remain farmers, which many do not - carry a spade and a laptop.

The President and a handful of association members traveled to Europe, Holland particularly, to study the latest lessons learned in farming. The two members that I interviewed seemed happy with the advances in plant disease control, and according to the president, everyone uses drip irrigation now; no one uses traditional irrigation methods(though I believe the ratio of traditional to modern irrigation is more skewed). There are plans to utilize hydroponics and they hope that within the next 5-8 years, greenhouses will become predominant so that no one is growing crops “outside.”

Thanks to support from HM - mainly articulated during that Ibri royal camp/symposium in 2009 - the group hopes to expand its membership and take advantage of government funding, in addition to membership dues of course.

I've translated parts of the "Statutes of the Agricultural Association for the farmers of the Batinah Region" :
Date: 2/19/2008

The goals of the association are:

1. Solving and overcoming all obstacles and problems that farmers of the association face.
2. Adopting modern technologies and providing agricultural supplies to all.
3. Guiding farmers to provide advanced agricultural equipment and using them for members’ farms.
4. Conducting research on experiences and technical information, and being in contact with experts inside and outside the Sultanate, in coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture and related fronts in the Sultanate.
5. Encouraging farmers to use environmentally friendly pesticides and avoid using chemicals that harm human health and the environment, and applying modern methods in agriculture.
6. Encourage farmers to rationalize water use by using MIS.
7. Striving to obtain/achieve marketing services and promotion for agricultural products, inside and outside the Sultanate and opening new markets to market members’ products.
8. Concluding special contracts and agreements to market the products of members and non members, for a certain fee, and opening local and foreign markets.
9. Participating in symposiums and agricultural research within and outside the Sultanate, following approval of the Ministry of Agriculture, to obtain new varieties of agricultural crops and developed means of harvesting and transactions after harvesting, from packaging to transport and specifications for exportation.
10. Diversifying seasonal crops and trying not to rely on one variety.
11. Encouraging farmers to use modern technologies for agriculture and thus decreasing water used and protecting the environment from pollution.
12. Encouraging farmers to use protected crops to improve the quality of the product and its continuation and increased production per unit area.
13. Any other work concerned with agriculture and its marketing, upon approval of the concerned party.

The association is NOT allowed to:

1. Form parties or engage in policy, or interfere in religious affairs.
2. Establish tribal or other blocs.
3. Benefit, participate, or organize an association, authority, or club with its headquarters outside of the country.
4. Send delegations outside of Oman, or host delegations from outside of Oman, expect upon approval of the Ministry of Social Development.
5. Undertake public ceremonies/celebrations, festivals, or hold public lectures, except with authorization from the appropriate ministry.
6. Practice forbidden games or drinking alcohol in the association headquarters.

Muscat Hosts GCC Water Conference

After throwing a few disgruntled looks at my fellow conference attendees who are holding full conversations while a speaker is at the podium, I settle into my seat in the Intercon Ballroom. Our introductory speaker from Spain unfortunately pursues a line of commentary on the remnants of water works built by Arabs in Andalusia. He undoubtedly hopes to highlight the ancient care for water resources originating in the Middle East, and therefore the roots of GCC concern for sustainable water use. I wince and wonder if those gathered here from around the Gulf appreciate the reminder that their empire once stretched to Spain but is now reduced to these small arid city-states.

I greatly enjoyed the token propaganda video that featured a rousing speech by the Sultan, Omani children walking through water, Omani children staring at a babbling brook, and the tagline: Water - security, health, life.

The diamonds in the rough of presentations were particularly enjoyable. I'll focus on two. 

Dr. Waleed Al Zabari focused on describing the GCC water status as a crisis. This may seem like a no-brainer, but oil abundant states have been spending large sums of money to increase supply (desalination) and subsidize water prices, meaning the GCC citizen does not feel an imminent water crisis. According to Dr. Al Zabari - and I agree - the region's governments must immediately discern how to sustainably use non-renewable (fossil) water. His cred went up in my eyes another notch when he clearly criticized the supply driven approaches that leaders have pursued, policies that have failed to achieve sustainable water use. While he commended the recent shift to demand management and conservation (even citing Oman's groundwater regulations, perhaps he was thinking of the un-implemented ones) he emphasized that officials must strive to treat the roots causes of unsustainable water use, not simply treating the symptoms. The three root issues and therefore policies that must be followed are: population policy change, agricultural policy change, and water management policy change. I have had an authoritarian streak lately, thinking - if only in my head - that there should be a worldwide cap on family size. As Dr. Al Zabari realizes, this first measure is more politically sensitive, and the last, least. But without the first two changes, water will never be used efficiently. As he underlined, the task we are facing is to supply water at minimum cost and maximum societal benefits. The only way to do this is to take water policy making out of that particular sector, and place it at the center of decision making. 

Douglas Owen's presentation focused on water management and technology, elaborating on many of the points articulated by Dr. Al Zabari. Owen emphasized the need to line up water management and supply options by cost (imagine a spectrum left to right – least to most expensive options – and then vertical bars representing how much water each of these options can reap). In this way, you enact policies from left to right, and save money by only resorting to highest cost projects if you have exhausted all cheaper options. Lower cost options that should receive more attention are fixing leakages in the water distribution network, optimizing agriculture, treating wastewater only to its necessary end (water for landscaping need not be as pure as treated water for crops), and desalinating brackish water. He ended with a call for on the importance of governance and improvement of institutions.

Take away themes

• Water issues must be at the center of policy discussions, rather than relegated to ministries with "water" in their title
• Cost-benefit analyses must be conducted to maximize the oil wealth that is being funneled into ventures to improve water use sustainability
• With expanding populations and increased urbanization, not planning now will blow up in officials' faces in the future
• Agriculture uses the most water, therefore agricultural policies must be reexamined.

All of this artwork I photographed from the hall outside the conference, done by local children. The top-most drawing was my favorite; the one neighbor is saying, "Water is a grace [from God] you idiot!"

Has Oman escaped the resource curse? هل هربت عُمان من "لعنة الموارد؟"

Question: How has Oman’s oil wealth influenced economic development?

Attempted Answer: Oman’s petrodollars have allowed dramatic modernization in the Sultanate, but we cannot say that Oman has wholly avoided the resource curse. Patronage exists, making development less efficient.

Explanation: Resource curse literature has blossomed in the last thirty years as scholars seek to understand the ‘paradox of plenty’: Why is it that countries so wealthy in oil, diamonds and other natural resources, tend to lack substantive economic development and trail behind states with fewer resources? The most recent strain of literature focuses on the role that institutions - their simple existence and/or their quality - play in funneling resource wealth into productive sectors.

Some have focused on constitutions, which define electoral rules and the process of forming legislation. These folks associate proportional representation systems (think of party lists that try to match the percentage of votes received to seats awarded), particularly when combined with presidential systems, with higher likelihood of “corrupt political rent seeking.” Parliamentary rule with plurality representation is the less corruption-prone alternative. Others identify institutional quality by taking into account the specific indicators of voice and accountability, political stability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, and control of corruption. In the end, what all researchers can agree on is that identifying causal relationships between resource abundance, institutions, economic development and political freedoms, is tough.

To me, the most complicated piece of this puzzle involves understanding the political incentives of highest and high level elites. It is generally assumed that the top leader (HM in our case) and then high level leaders (elected and appointed officials) will grab for oil rents to support the continuance of their rule. With petrodollars in their coffers, supporter loyalty is rewarded by funding megaprojects, doling out public sector jobs, and/or coddling citizens by making life increasingly pleasant.

In this way, politicians have competing incentives, (1) invest oil wealth wisely (ex. make citizens happy by fostering private sector opportunities) and (2) use money unproductively (ex. build up security forces). The balance of incentives depends on the institutions present in a state and their relative quality. Institutions that restrain the policy maker will guide oil wealth into productive investments, while the absence of such norms and bodies will result in the misuse of money and lack of economic growth.

Oman seems a significant case study to examine. Oil rents trickled in during the reign of Sultan Qaboos’s father, but it was not until after the bloodless coup that wealth began to truly accrue. Since the “blessed renaissance,” as the ascendancy of Sultan Qaboos is referred to, Oman has undergone modernization and economic development. At the beginning of his rule, the balance of incentives for HM weighed heavily to the “preserve power and stability” side of the scale. Fighting to quell two internal rebellions and with the memory of how he himself uprooted a ruler, Qaboos assuredly sought to reward supporters and pacify the people at large with the help of oil wealth.

Yet at some point, the balance began to tip. When can we say that Qaboos felt safe in power? Certainly his campaign worked. He united the inner, religious parts of Oman, the settled area of Muscat, and the far off south to create a modern state. He appropriated the role of the tribal leader by providing goods and services and constructing a Basic Law. And he built up the public sector while introducing two consultative bodies; one elected by the people, and one filled with his appointees. Patronage was present. Citizens were cajoled. And I can say truthfully that I have not met one person who questions the legitimacy of the Sultan’s rule today.

According to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, while political stability and regulatory quality have increased incrementally in Oman from 1998 to 2008, voice and accountability has decreased to red zone levels. Government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption have wavered in the past decade, but remain in the 60-75 percentile range. Transparency International ranks Oman 39th globally and 4th regionally in the 2009 Corruption Perception Index (1st being LEAST corrupt). Oman is rated the 65th easiest place to do business in the world, or the 7th regionally. And the Sultanate was praised for weathering the international financial crisis. Plans for economic diversification are in place, if not whole heartedly followed yet.

All in all, this situation does not look as dire as a “resource curse” would predict. Institutional quality was very poor when Sultan Qaboos assumed the throne, and yet there have been positive gains since the nahda. While observers and citizens rightfully complain about misuse of government money (case in point: the poorly planned airport expansion, see here and here) things could be worse, and most likely would have been without oil wealth. Without falling into complacency, it can be objectively argued that Oman is a model for gradual economic and political expansion with the aid of resource abundance.

Perhaps the current economic state of Oman is most directly tied to the Sultan's belief that his power is secure, in addition to his knowledge that the state's natural resources are finite. When a ruler sees his power extending into the more distant future, incentives are altered so that he focuses on investing in long-term state development to further legitimacy and political stability. HM must continue to develop institutional quality now, particularly on the accountability front, while maintaining a push for privatisation and diversification. In doing so he will lessen the likelihood of instability accompanying the power transfer upon his death, as will the probability that Oman's next ruler will fall into a resource curse trap. And regard for his prestige and legacy as the Sultanate's modern ruler are incentive.

Facets I will be investigating in the future: The role of the higher, not highest, level elite in Oman when we discuss incentives in distributing oil wealth. The desire that these leaders have in remaining in power, as well as the relative prestige of differing political positions (majlis ash shura, majlis ad dawla, ministry hierarchy). Political and civil freedoms, and their connection to resource dependence.

* This is a blog. It is not a forum for an exhaustive analysis on the politics of oil dependent states. Just keep that in mind. That said, comment away! *

السؤال: كيف ثروة نفطية عمان اثّرت على التنمية الاقتصادية هنا؟

الإجابة: لقد مكّنت الثروة النفطية التحديث الهائل في السلطنة, لكن, لا يمكن القول إنها تجنبت لعنة الموارد كلها.

الشرح: ازدادت الكتابة عن موضوع لعنة الموارد في الثلاثين سنة الاخيرة كما يسعى الباحثون إلى فهم "مفارقة الوفرة": لماذا هو الحال أن الدول بثروة النفط, او الماس, أو الموارد الطبيعية الاخرى, تعتاد على نقص التنمية الاقتصادية الجديرة بالاعتبار وتتخلف الدول التي لديها الموارد القليلة فقط؟ وأحدث اتجاه في هذه المناقشة هو التركيز على الدور الذي تلعبه المؤسسات – وجودتها و/أو جودتها – في إرشاد ثروة الموارد و إرسالها إلى القطاعات الأكثر منتجة.

ركّز بعض الكُتاب على الدساتير, التي تعرّف قواعد الانتخابات وعملية صياغة التشريعات. هؤلاء الناس يرتبطون نظم التمثيل النسبي (بالقوائم الحزبية التي تحاول أن تنسق النسبة المئوية للأصوات والمقاعد في البرلمان), خصوصا عندما نجمعه مع النظام الرئاسي, باحتمال أكبر لـ"السعى السياسي الفاسد للفلوس من النفط." ونظام الحكم البرلماني بالتعددية هو البديل باحتمال أقل للفساد. يشير الناس الاخرون إلى الجودة المؤسسية ويحاسبون على المؤشرات المعينة مثل الصوت والمساءلة, والاستقرار السياسي والعنف, فعالية الحكومة, والاعباء التنظيمية, وسيادة القانون, ومكافحة الفساد. في النهاية, كل الباحثين يوافقون على أن تحديد العلاقات السببية بين مواضيع الوفرة الطبيعية, والمؤسسات, والتنمية الاقتصادية, والحقوق السياسية, هو صعب.

بالنسبة لي, أعقد جزء من هذا اللغز هو فهم الحوافز السياسية لديها أعلى ومستوى علي السياسيين تحت القائد الرئيسي. عموما, من المفترض أن القائد الأعلى (في سياقنا, جلالة السلطان قابوس) وبعد ذلك القادة في المستوى العالي (المسؤولون المنتخبون والمعيّنون) سوف يمسكون للفلوس النفطية لدعم استمرار سيطرتهم. وبالاموال النفطية في بنوكهم, سيقنعون الانصار عن طريق تمويل المشاريع الهائلة, وتعيين الوظائف في القطاع العام, و/أو تدليل المواطنين بجعل الحياة حلوة.

في هذه الحالة, لدى السياسيين الحوافز المنافسة, (1) استثمار الثروة النفطية بحكمة (مثلا, جعل المواطنين سعيدين عن طريق الدعم للفرص في القطاع الخاص) و (2) استخدام الاموال بشكل غير منتجة (مثلا الدعم لازداد القوات الامنية). ويعتمد التوازن بين الحوافز على المؤسسات الموجودة في الدولة وجودتها النسبية. المؤسسات التي تقيد صانعي القرار ستنقل الثروة النفطية إلى الاستثمارات المنتجية, بينما انعدام هذه المعايير والمنظمات سيٌسفر عن سوء استخدام الثروة وانعدام التنمية الاقتصادية.

يبدو أن عٌمان حالة جيدة للبحث. دخلت الفلوس من النفط إلى عمان خلال فترة حكم أب السلطان قابوس, لكن ما كان حتى بعد الاطاحة أن الثروة تدفقت حقا. ومنذ النهضة المباركة, قد قامت عمان بالتحديث والتنمية الاقتصادية. في بداية وقته كقائد عمان, أثقل الحافزة للجلالة على الميزان كانت لـ"محافظة على القوى والاستقرار". وقتالة لقمع حربين داخلين وبالذكرى عن كيفية اقتلع حاكم من العرش, من المؤكد أنه سعى إلى مكافئة انصاره وترضية الشعب بشكل عام, بالمساعدة من الثروة النفطية.

لكن, في نقطة ما خلال هذه الفترة تحت رعاية السلطان قابوس, بدأ التوازن أن يتحول. وما هو الوقت يمكن أن نقول إنه شعر بأن حكمه كان امن؟ بالتأكيد, نجحت حملته. وحّد الداخلية, المنطقة المتدينة, بالحضارة في مسقط, وبالجنوب, لجعل دولة حديثة. اخذ دور شيخ القبيلة كما وفّر السلع والخدمات, ولصياغة القانون العام. وبناء القطاع العام بينما خلق مجلسين, الواحد منتخب على يد المواطنين, والثاني امتلأ بتعييناته. الرعاية كانت موجودة. داهن السلطان المواطنين. وأستطيع أن أقول بصدق, لم ألتقيتُ عماني يشك بشرعية حكم السلطان اليوم.

بحسب مؤشرات البنك الدولي عن الحكم العالمي, بينما ازداد الاستقرار السياسي والجودة التنظيمية في عمان من عام 1998 إلى 2008, انخفض مستوى الصوت والمساءلة إلى "المنطقة الأحمر." وفعالية الحكومة, وسيادة القانون, والسيطرة على الفساد, كلها قد تلعثمت في العقد الماضي, لكن تستمر في المدى 60-75%. في نفس الوقت, وقعت منظمة الشفافية الدولية السلطنة 39 في العالم و4 في المنقطة في قائمة تصور الفساد 2009 (و1 هو بالأقل من الفساد). عمان قد وقعت الـ65 أسهل دولة ليشترك في العمل, في العالم, أو الـ7 في المنطقة. مُدحت السلطنة لاداءها خلال الازمة المالية العالمية. والخطط للتنويع الاقتصادي موجود, حتى ولو لم تتطبق بسرعة كافية.

على العموم, لا يبدو أن وضع عمان يدعم "لعنة الموارد". كانت جودة المؤسسات ضعيفة جدا في الوقت ارتقاء العرش قابوس, ولكن شاهدنا التحسينات منذ النهضة. وبينما يشكو المراقبون والمواطنون عن سوء استخدام الفلوس الحكومية (مثلا: التخطيط لتوسيع المطار) كان من الممكن أن حالة عمان ستكون أسوأ, خصوصا بدون النفط. وبدون الاستسلام للتهاون, يمكن أن نقول بموضوعية أن عمان نموذج للتوسيع التدريجي بشان الاقتصاد والسياسة, بالمساعدة من وفرة الموارد.

ربما تربط الحالة الاقتصادية العمانية في هذا الوقت مباشرة إلى الحق أن السلطان يعتقد بان سلطته امنة, بالاضافة إلى معرفته في حد الموارد الطبيعية. عندما يرى قائد تمديد حكمه إلى المستقبل البعيد, تغير الحوافز لكي يركز على استثمار في الدولة على المدى البعيد لدعم شرعية حكمه والاستقرار السياسي. يجب ان الجلالة يستمر ان يتطور الجودة المؤسسية الآن, خصوصا المساءلة, بينما يستمر الجهود لتحسين الخصخصة والتنويع. وعن هذا الطريق, سوف يكون عدم الاستقرار أقل احتمالا, بعد موته في المستبقل, وسيتجنب القائد التالي فخ "لعنة الموارد." ورغبته في الهيبة وإرثه كقائد السلطنة في الحقبة الحديثة, هو حافزة كبيرة.

الرقص العُماني Omani Dance

ذهبت إلى زفتي الاولى في السلطنة. وبالرغم من أنها كانت مختلفة من الزفاف العادية - كان العريس من عائلة بارزة والعروس ايضا - شعرتُ بأنني شاهدتُ اجزاء مهمة من الثقافة العمانية. وأفضل من تجربات اليلة كانت مشاهدة الرقص العماني! توجد رقصات عمانية كثيرة, وفي هذه الزفة, مقارنة بالزفاف التقليدية, رقص الرجال مع النساء.

هنا امثلة من يوتوب من الرقص العماني! ولقراءة المزيد عن اسلوب وايقاع الرقص التقليدي, في موقع جيد من مركز عماني للموسيقى التليقدية هنا

I went to my first wedding in the Sultanate. And although it was different from usual weddings - the groom was from a prominent family as was the bride - I felt as though I saw important parts of the Omani culture. The best of the night's experiences was watching Omani dancing! There are many Omani dances, and at this wedding, compared to traditional weddings, men danced with women.

Here are examples from YouTube of the Oman dance! And to read more on the style and rhythm of the traditional dance, there is a good site from the Oman Centre for Traditional Music here.

فيديو عن شعوذة البندقية والرقص العماني, أسمه "رقص الميل" بالعصا

Video on rifle juggling and the Omani dance that I call "the lean dance" with the 'asa (the omani stick that is part of traditional male dress)

فيديو عن رقص الرجال التقليدي في احتفال العمانيين الموجودين في المملكة المتحدة.

Video of traditional male dancing at a celebration of Omanis in the UK.

فيديو اضافي وجدتُه في هذه عملية البحوث, تصوير الترحيب العماني التقليدي بين الرجال.

An additional video that I found during this whole search process, depicting the traditional Omani greeting between men.

It's not a problem, until I SAY it's a problem

I'm Evel Knievel on the roads here. No, I'm not soaring over stretches of parked cars with my 2009 Yaris. But I am tempting fate every time I get behind the wheel. Likening driving in Oman to Hobbe's state of nature, I see everyone out on the road, in his or her own car, not caring about the community of drivers. You do not mess with the Hummer in the left hand lane who is pushing 140 kph. You shift over to the right so that his pace can continue unabated. Traffic circles are the ultimate state of nature. Yes, there may be loosely defined rules, but merging and exiting happen at will and not based on rational, communal thinking. Two lanes become one? No, we do not use the "every other" technique in the Sultanate. We prefer the "whoever drives faster and almost side-swipes your car makes it to the condensed lane first," method. Overtaking on dual carriageways. Speeding in camel and goat infested waters. No seat belts. Children on laps. Broken headlights. Lane creation at will. But I'm not keeping track or anything.

So while I have alluded to my highway woes in a previous post, a discussion on decision making in Oman, a recent streak of particularly aggressive driving, and an in-your-face safety campaign, force me to take this up again.

Omanis have always been aware of road dangers in their country. This does not mean that citizens were always allowed to talk about it. When Salim and Salimah, a 100% Omani-run LLC that has received MEPI funding kicked off its driver awareness campaign in 2002 the atmosphere for reforming road standards was not present. Some questioned the founders as to why and how they would talk publicly about the 28 per 100,000 people (the numbers may have been greater at that time) that die on the road in the Sultanate.

The disinclination to recognize, expose, criticize and discuss topics of concern in Oman is distressing. Omani author of the "Generation of the Father and Generation of the Son" philosophy below, willingly recognized that a problem in this state is not a problem, until the Sultan says so. And any move to acknowledge a perceived societal deficiency is not viewed as constructive criticism - aimed to improve the state - but as a move to attack the honor of the "collective tribe" of Oman. HIV/AIDS statistics and deaths, and political discussion do not enjoy the backing of the Sultan as of yet. Women's issues, water and food security and now road safety have been taken up by HM and receive strong support.

Naturally, other groups are jumping on the driver's ed bandwagon. PDO established a Traffic Safety Institute in 2006 and now the Royal Oman Police are taking it up a notch by planting themselves in City Center [the most popular mall in Muscat]. With elaborate yet informative displays, eye-catching-if-morbid-artwork (see skull embedded in car parts), and crash test dummies on stretchers, it is not easy to avoid the exhibition. Yet Omanis, and the expats that quickly adopt this style of driving, are loath to sign the driving social contract: I drive safely. You drive responsibly. We all live. And, oddly enough, it doesn't take us that much longer to get to our final destination.